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Assistant United States Trade Representative for Labor
(as prepared for delivery)
Last year's electoral campaign and this year's debate, over the
proposed United States trade agreement with six Central American
countries, have brought out many myths, assertions, and arguments
concerning the labor provisions in recent U.S. trade agreements.
What this rhetoric reveals is that, even though there is an existing
Congressional compromise about how we should address worker rights
concerns in U.S. trade agreements, there really is no solid consensus
that we are doing the right thing in this policy area.
This afternoon, after a quick review of the history of labor stan-
dards in United States trade policy, I will try to respond to the most
common misunderstandings and questions concerning the current
U.S. approach to ensuring that enforceable labor standards are in-
cluded in U.S. free trade agreements. The U.S. is trying to ensure that
American workers, as well as the workers of our trading partners, are
both made better off by negotiating trade agreements that combine
trade liberalization with the protection of worker rights.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TRADE & LABOR
The first U.S. trade legislation with a "linkage" between trade
and labor standards is arguably the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890,
which prohibited the import of goods made by convict labor. That pro-
vision, expanded in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 to cover con-
vict, forced, and/or indentured labor is still in effect. The National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (IRA), although found to be unconsti-
tutional in 1935, went considerably further. The IRA restricted the
import of any and all goods "that impair codes of fair competition, in-
cluding the right to organize and bargain collectively, the right to join,
organize or assist a labor organization, and compliance with maximum
hours of work and minimum rates of pay." Note: both of these acts
were completely unilateral U.S. restrictions on imports.
The Trade Act of 1974 instructed U.S. negotiators to seek "the
adoption of international fair labor standards.., in the GATT." This
was the first time Congress asked U.S. trading partners - as opposed
to enacting unilateral restrictions - to consider the relationship of
trade liberalization with the protection of workers' rights. Finally, the
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Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 defined the denial of
certain worker rights as "unreasonable" actions for the purposes of
Section 301 of the Trade Act - a provision that went totally unused
until March of this year when the AFL-CIO led a coalition in filing a
section 301 petition against China. The U.S. government declined to
accept this petition for formal review, although certainly not because it
approves of China's labor regime.
It is more realistic to say that the current U.S. trade policy re-
garding labor standards began its evolution just over twenty years
ago. It did so with the country eligibility criteria of the "Caribbean
Basin Initiative" (CBI) trade preference program, signed into law by
President Reagan in 1983. The CBI worker rights language was cop-
ied and incorporated the next year into the "Generalized System of
Preferences" (GSP). CBI and GSP are unilateral trade preference pro-
grams under which eligible less-developed countries can ship certain
specified goods to the U.S. duty-free. The CBI and GSP statutes re-
quire the president to determine if a developing country "has taken or
is taking steps" to provide its workers with "internationally recognized
worker rights," and sets forth a definition of that term. Very similar,
although not identical, worker rights eligibility criteria have been in-
cluded in subsequent U.S. trade preference programs, the Andean
Trade Promotion Act (ATPA) in 1991, the African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, and very similar worker rights have been
in the eligibility criteria for OPIC since 1985.
The 1993 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), generally known as the NAFTA labor side-agreement, had
the objective of improving working conditions and living standards in
the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. As the title implies, the preferred ap-
proach is through cooperation, including information exchanges, tech-
nical assistance, and consultations. NAALC obligates each Party to
promote compliance with and "effectively enforce" its labor laws, and
provides for consultations and a dispute settlement mechanism (which
has never been invoked) in cases of non-enforcement of some specific
labor laws. (Note: the Canada-Chile and the Canada-Costa Rica labor
side-agreements copied this model).
The United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement negotiated
by the Clinton Administration, but submitted to Congress by the cur-
rent Bush Administration, is the first U.S. bilateral trade agreement
to incorporate labor provisions within the main body of the trade
agreement. The primary labor clauses of the U.S.-Jordan FTA require
that each Party will:
* "strive to ensure" that its laws incorporate the 1998
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work;
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" "strive to ensure" it does not waive or derogate from
domestic labor laws as an encouragement for trade;
and,
* not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws in a man-
ner affecting trade between the Parties.
The FTA "dispute settlement" provisions, such as they are, ap-
ply to the labor provisions, meaning that if the Joint Committee estab-
lished by the agreement does not resolve a dispute, the affected Party
is entitled to take "any appropriate and commensurate measure."
Congress voted to approve the U.S.-Jordan FTA only after the two Par-
ties exchanged letters pledging never to use trade sanctions as one of
those measures for any dispute under the FTA.
II. UNITED STATES TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
The United States Constitution empowers Congress, not the
Executive Branch, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations," and
"to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." These are pow-
ers that Congress jealously guards, and yet occasionally delegates to
the president. For the past several years the President has further
delegated these powers to the U.S. Trade Representative. The most
recent delegation of such authority, after an eight-year hiatus, came in
the Trade Act of 2002; particularly part B of the Act, known as the
"Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (TPA)."
Whether, and if so how, to incorporate worker rights in the
TPA was vigorously and fully debated in Congress. Some Members,
fearing that labor provisions would only be used for protectionist pur-
poses, clearly favored the NAFTA/NAALC "side agreement" model. At
the other extreme, amendments were proposed that would have re-
quired both the adoption of ILO-consistent labor laws and the imposi-
tion of trade sanctions if/when any such laws were not fully enforced.
In the end, Congress reached a bipartisan compromise, based signifi-
cantly on the Senate version, on how to incorporate worker rights in
U.S. trade agreements. (Remember that in 2002 the House of Repre-
sentatives had a working Republican majority, while the Senate was
narrowly controlled by the Democrats).
That bipartisan compromise included the "Jordan language" -
to not fail to effectively enforce domestic labor laws - as a binding obli-
gation, subject to dispute settlement, as well as numerous other labor-
related clauses. Not least among those other labor-related provisions
are instructions to consult with the U.S. trading partners regarding
their labor laws and provide technical assistance when necessary; to
establish consultative procedures to strengthen the capacity of our
trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards; and,
when the U.S. sends proposed FTAs to Congress to send a "meaningful
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labor rights report" on the countries with which the U.S. has been ne-
gotiating along with.
What is significant, but not really self-evident, is that Congress
divided its instructions to the executive branch into three areas: "over-
all" and "principal" trade negotiating objectives, and the "promotion of
certain priorities." While there are labor-related clauses in all three of
these TPA sections, the significance of this division is that only "princi-
pal" negotiating objectives are required to have access to dispute set-
tlement procedures and remedies for non-compliance.
Even though Congress voted in favor of Trade Promotion Au-
thority with these labor provisions, neither side in the trade-and-labor
debate is really happy with them. Congressional Democrats continue
to believe that having only one "enforceable" labor obligation is insuffi-
cient to protect the worker rights of our trading partners, nor to pro-
tect American workers from "unfair" competition. On the other side of
the aisle, there is a lingering concern that labor clauses in trade agree-
ments are there only for "protectionist" purposes, and are inherently a
barrier to trade liberalization.
Now I claim to be the "best-ever" Assistant United States
Trade Representative for Labor. This is a pretty safe claim, because I
am the first and only AUSTR for Labor to date. Ambassador Zoellick
appointed me because he knew - and fully supported - that Congress
simply would not grant the Bush Administration trade negotiating au-
thority unless it included binding and enforceable worker rights provi-
sions. It has therefore been a large part of my job to ensure that these
TPA labor provisions - our instructions from Congress - are fully incor-
porated into all U.S. free trade agreements.
We think we have done so. And we think we have gone further.
While negotiating the trade agreement with Central America, we were
actively involved in a "three-track" approach to improving protections
for worker rights:
1. Negotiating the text of the labor chapter, and its ca-
pacity-building Annex, that fully meets TPA
objectives.
2. Working with our trading partners to improve the
application and enforcement of labor laws during the
course of the negotiations. A base-line review of the
labor laws of the six countries conducted by the ILO
provided an important starting point for this
exercise.
3. Setting in place longer-term technical assistance pro-
grams and projects to help ensure there will be con-
tinued improvements in the protection of core labor
standards in these countries.
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To date, Congress has voted to approve four FTAs incorporat-
ing TPA-consistent labor clauses: Chile, Singapore, Morocco, and Aus-
tralia. The U.S. has completed negotiations for additional FTAs with
the Arabian Gulf State of Bahrain, and with six Central American
countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), an agreement known as CAFTA.
The President, however, has not yet formally submitted these agree-
ments to Congress for approval. The U.S. is also engaged in FTA nego-
tiations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (two more pieces,
along with American FTAs with Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain,
towards President Bush's announced goal of a Middle East Free Trade
Area (MEFTA)), Panama, the five countries comprising the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) three Andean Countries, and
Thailand.
The U. S. is also, of course, continuing to pursue the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), linking all thirty-four democracies in the
Western Hemisphere. The United States has tabled TPA-consistent
labor text for the FTAA, but there is not a consensus on labor provi-
sions at this time. Finally, the United States' trade negotiating
agenda contains a full and firm commitment to the successful conclu-
sion of the Doha Development Agenda in the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Deadlines have been missed, but we believe that the economic
opportunities that will be opened for all workers via the WTO will not
be foregone.
III. COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT CURRENT
TRADE/LABOR LINKAGES
Despite the bipartisan nature of the Congressional compromise
on how to include worker rights in U.S. trade agreements, and a signif-
icant legislative and negotiating history concerning the wording of la-
bor provisions in American trade agreements, there continue to be
numerous questions and criticisms of the labor clauses in the FTAs
that have been negotiated under TPA. Critics of the administration's
labor provisions have been increasingly vocal as Congress nears a vote
on CAFTA. So please let me now pose some of those questions/allega-
tions, and give you brief answers to them:
1. Why don't recently concluded U.S. free trade agree-
ments (FTAs), especially CAFTA, include "strong and
enforceable" labor provisions?
The recently concluded FTA with five Central Ameri-
can Republics and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA),
like our FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Mo-
rocco, and Bahrain, include - within the text of the
FTA, not as the NAFTA "side-agreement" - strong
and enforceable labor provisions.
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The CAFTA Labor Chapter is more "robust" than the
U.S.-Jordan FTA, or even the U.S.-Chile FTA ap-
proved by Congress last year, in its enumeration of
procedural guarantees, including access to fair, equi-
table, and transparent proceedings for the enforce-
ment of labor laws, as well as the institutional
arrangements for consultations, dispute settlement
provisions, and of course remedies ("penalties") for
non-compliance.
* The Labor Chapter includes an Annex on labor coop-
eration and capacity building that reflects a carefully
considered approach to the long-term protection of
worker rights in our Central American partners.
2. Why aren't countries required to have labor laws that
fully incorporate ILO standards?
* Our analysis, supported by an impartial review/study
by the ILO, shows that the labor laws of America's
CAFTA partners are generally compliant with ILO
standards. These ILO labor law reviews, requested
by the Central American Countries, are available on
the ILO's web site.
* Congress debated and rejected a version of TPA that
would have "required" full incorporation of ILO Con-
ventions into the labor laws of our trading partners.
* Congress has, on several occasions, indicated its ap-
proval of the formulation that the United States and
its trading partners should "strive to ensure" that do-
mestic labor laws incorporated the principles of the
ILO Declaration, without reference to the actual ILO
conventions.
* And, of course, since the U.S. has ratified only two of
the eight "core" ILO conventions, it is a standard the
U.S. itself could not meet. (El Salvador has ratified
six of the eight conventions, while the other countries
have ratified all eight).
3. Even if their labor laws are adequate now, is there
anything in CAFTA to prevent one of the Central
American countries from later amending its labor
laws to reduce worker rights?
This is extremely unlikely, since the evidence is clear
that all of these countries are taking significant
strides towards democracy and openness, in some
cases after years of bitter civil wars and "class
struggles."
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* In most of these countries basic worker rights are
constitutional guarantees, not civil code provisions.
* The U.S. has defensive concerns regarding any "don't
amend your labor laws" clause, e.g. fearing com-
plaints/disputes regarding changes to American
safety and health laws or wage and hour regulations.
4. Because only the "effective enforcement" clause is sub-
ject to dispute settlement and possible remedies, isn't
CAFTA ("the Chile model") weaker than the Jordan
FTA, where all labor clauses were covered?
* The effective labor law enforcement clause of the
CAFTA labor text is exactly the same as the labor ar-
ticle of the Jordan FTA.
* All other labor clauses in the Jordan FTA (which are
much fewer and less specific than in CAFTA) are for-
mulated as "strive to" commitments, not binding obli-
gations, and hence they would not be fully subject to
dispute settlement or any trade remedies at all.
* A comparison of the Jordan and CAFTA labor provi-
sions makes it very clear that CAFTA's labor clauses
are very much "Jordan plus." FYI: We have posted a
line-by-line comparison of the Jordan, Morocco (ap-
proved by Congress last year), and CAFTA-D.R. labor
texts on the U.S. Trade Representative web site.
5. Under CAFTA, the United States will give up the lev-
erage it has under GSP/ CBTPA, particularly the pe-
tition process asking for removing benefits from a
country that is not "taking steps" to provide interna-
tionally recognized worker rights.
* The labor laws a country is obligated to effectively en-
force under CAFTA cover all internationally recog-
nized worker rights used as eligibility criteria for
GSP and CBTPA.
" Suspension or removal of GSP/CBTPA benefits is a
very blunt instrument, which could harm the very
workers whose rights we are trying to protect. Under
CAFTA, if a country does not adequately protecting
worker rights, the government would pay a signifi-
cant fine until the situation is remedied.
* By signing onto CAFTA, our partner countries very
publicly accept the obligation to have laws that incor-
porate ILO standards and to effectively enforce those
labor laws. The GSP/CBTPA labor provisions were
unilaterally imposed upon them by the U.S.
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Procedures for public submissions (from trade un-
ions, human rights NGOs or others) alleging non-
compliance with the labor provisions are included in
the Labor Chapter text. These procedures are
modeled after the NAALC submissions process.
6. CAFTA provides a very weak enforcement mechanism
because a country can "continue to fail to enforce its
labor laws in order to gain a trade advantage as long
as it pays a small fine to itself to support vaguely de-
fined labor activities." (Quote from the AFL-CIO).
" Relative to the size, level of income, and labor minis-
try budgets of our CAFTA partners, a fine of up to
$15 million a year is certainly not "small."
* As the complaining party in a dispute involving labor
law enforcement, the United States would always re-
tain a veto over the use of any and all fines collected.
These fines are paid into a special fund and are not
returned to the other party.
* The funds would be targeted to improve and protect
the specific worker rights that had been violated by a
party's failure to enforce its labor laws. The design of
any such programs will be done on a case-by-case
basis.
7. Why do we even need labor provisions in U.S. trade
agreements? Shouldn't the promotion of worker
rights be left to the ILO?
Congress, in the Trade Act of 2002, and consistent
with prior trade/labor legislative history, made it
abundantly clear that our trade agreements should
contain enforceable worker rights provisions. Such
provisions:
0 Assure that the benefits of trade liberalization are
shared equitably by the workers of America's trad-
ing partners; and
o Help protect American workers from unfair com-
petition by workers who are denied fundamental
labor rights.
While ILO Conventions set internationally recog-
nized labor standards, the ILO's supervisory mecha-
nisms are not designed to be part of trade
agreements. The ILO has asked its members to take
trade-related actions only in the most egregious cases
(ex. when Poland outlawed Solidarity, in response to
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apartheid in South Africa, and most recently because
of slave labor in Burma/Myanmar).
I hope my remarks today have helped you understand the
background, legislative history, and intent of the labor provisions in
recent United States trade agreements. For those of you interested in
the debate over the labor provisions in CAFTA, I strongly suggest that
you look at the U.S.T.R.'s web page that was set up for this purpose:
www.ustr. gov/trade-agreements/bilateral/CAFTA-DR/briefing-book/
sectionindex.html.
Now I hope we have time remaining for me to respond to any
questions that you may have.
